Live

Incident with Actions

On August 26, 2026 from 15:02 to 15:45 UTC, Actions jobs failed to start. The following 2 hours until 17:40 UTC, Actions runs were delayed starting by more than 5 minutes as the system caught up with delayed load. This impact was triggered by saturation of writes to the database primary used by the service processing triggers for Actions workflows. The primary was failed over, but the system did not fully recover. The saturation was caused by growing daily peak load combined with an upstream issue in GitHub’s event processing infrastructure, https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/hcbtzksccj2f, which caused burst amplification of already-high load. Downstream throttles that were later used to recover were set ~10% too high to protect the system. At 15:45 UTC, throttling combined with service restarts recovered the service’s core health. Those throttles were gradually raised between 15:54 and 17:22 to restore full webhook processing for Actions runs. This ramp was deliberately slow to en

The latest update from GitHub.

State

Resolved

Started

67 d ago

2026-08-26 15:11 UTC

Lasted

2 h 50 min

until 2026-08-26 18:01 UTC

Worst impact

Major outage

Timeline

11 updates
15:1115:5416:3617:1918:01
Major outageUpdate postedTimes in UTC

Investigating

2 h 43 min 96%

Monitoring

7 min 4%

Updates

Times in UTC

As posted by GitHub

Resolved2026-08-26 18:01 UTC

On August 26, 2026 from 15:02 to 15:45 UTC, Actions jobs failed to start. The following 2 hours until 17:40 UTC, Actions runs were delayed starting by more than 5 minutes as the system caught up with delayed load. This impact was triggered by saturation of writes to the database primary used by the service processing triggers for Actions workflows. The primary was failed over, but the system did not fully recover. The saturation was caused by growing daily peak load combined with an upstream issue in GitHub’s event processing infrastructure, https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/hcbtzksccj2f, which caused burst amplification of already-high load. Downstream throttles that were later used to recover were set ~10% too high to protect the system. At 15:45 UTC, throttling combined with service restarts recovered the service’s core health. Those throttles were gradually raised between 15:54 and 17:22 to restore full webhook processing for Actions runs. This ramp was deliberately slow to en

Monitoring2026-08-26 18:00 UTC

All inbound queues have recovered and Actions is operating as expected. 3.7% of jobs assigned to larger runners during the early stage of this incident are stuck waiting for runner assignment. Those will be canceled within the hour. Other runners are successfully processing all new jobs.

Monitoring2026-08-26 17:54 UTC

The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

Investigating2026-08-26 17:32 UTC

We are continuing to observe recovery and expect actions inbound queues to be back to normal in <30min. Work will continue to flow through the system subject to per-customer concurrency limits.

Investigating2026-08-26 16:50 UTC

We are continuing to observe recovery and delayed queues are burning down. Some customers will continue to see increased delays until all throttled work has been completed - we expect this within the next hour.

Investigating2026-08-26 16:49 UTC

Pages is operating normally.

Investigating2026-08-26 16:14 UTC

We believe we've identified and addressed the issue and are ramping traffic back up slowly to ensure it doesn't recur. Some customers will continue to see delays as we ramp up.

Investigating2026-08-26 15:48 UTC

primary failover briefly improved performance but did not fully mitigate, we've throttled inbound traffic and are investigating upstream Vitess issues

Investigating2026-08-26 15:23 UTC

We've identified an issue with a database primary and are failing over to a replica immediately

Investigating2026-08-26 15:12 UTC

Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

Investigating2026-08-26 15:11 UTC

We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Actions

Affected components

2
ActionsPages

GitHub in the last 90 days

Full history
90 days agoToday

Incidents in 90 days

46

Days with an incident

34

Median duration

1 h 29 min

This incident

1.9× the median

How long each incident lasted, on the day it started. The outlined bar is this incident.

20 h 7 min
median 1 h 29 min
90 days agoToday

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Prompt
Install the outages.live MCP server, so that when something breaks you can tell if the cause is a provider we depend on and not my code. It reads the official status pages of cloud, AI, payment and developer providers and gives you their incidents as MCP tools.

Add it as a remote MCP server named "outages" at https://outages.cc/mcp (Streamable HTTP, no authentication), with your CLI command or your MCP config file.

Then:
1. Make sure it connects and shows the tools get_provider, list_feed and send_feedback.
2. Call get_provider with "github" and tell me if GitHub has a problem right now.
3. From now on, when a call to a third-party service fails or becomes slow, call get_provider for that service before you change my code.

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